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The lack of studies about the impact of demographic and economic variables 
such as ageing, productivity and unemployment, on Portuguese Social Security 
expenditures, arises expected concerns on its financial sustainability. From a theoretical 
perspective, low fertility increases old-age dependence index and decreases economic 
growth, reinforced by unemployment which shrinks the contributory base and 
productivity (increasing the burden of pension expenditures on the overall economy). 
However, it is crucial to develop an applied work in this field in Portugal to assess these 
conclusions. 
Using Portuguese time-series data from 1975 to 2014, it was found statistical 
evidence of cointegration between unemployed people aged between 15 and 64 years 
old, apparent productivity of labour and old-age dependence index (explanatory 
variables) and pension expenditure as a share of GDP (dependent variable), but the sign 
of long-run coefficient for the demographic component differs when the dummy 
components are excluded, raising doubts about the impact of ageing on pension 
expenditures. The remaining explanatory variables present a positive sign, positively 
influencing the pension expenditure as a share of GDP. At last, it was developed a VECM 
model with impulse-response functions and variance decomposition, and the results 
showed that, in Portugal, ageing has an almost insignificant impact in the long-run, 
comparing with unemployment and productivity. 
JEL Classification: C32, C51, C52, H55 






This dissertation tries to bring an alternative point of view in relation to a topic 
which has become a great concern for public finances in Portugal and a big question 
mark for contributors and pensioners: the future of the Social Security System in an 
increasing ageing society.  
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Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in the analysis of the impact of ageing 
on public finances, particularly in terms of fiscal costs and consequently government 
deficits in Portugal, raising questions about the financial sustainability of the social 
security system. As Carone et al. (2005) pointed out, recent demographic forecasts 
about the evolution of Portuguese population induce several impacts on real economy, 
encompassing the quality of labour inputs (influenced by the age structure and the 
human capital accumulated by the workforce), the capital/labour ratio, labour-
augmenting technical progress and labour input as direct effects. Moreover, the 
reinforcement of indirect effects, such as the rise in labour taxes to finance age-related 
spending (which may cause unemployment and distortions of economic decisions, 
affecting the labour supply) can step up an even more shrinkage on economic growth.  
But the literature arguments diverge: for instance, such change on the 
population age structure and the progress on life expectancy are associated to profound 
changes (and, some of them, positive) suffered by the social structures, such as the 
creation of social security, the increase of education, the increase of productivity or the 
decrease of hours worked. A young age structure can be beneficial in a rural society, 
mostly dependent on the quantity of labour force, but can be disadvantageous in an 
advanced industrial society mostly dependent on capital and labour force knowledge, 
allowing the connection between ageing and economic growth (Rosa, 1996). 
Regarding the mainstream literature about pensions, the last changes on 
population and social structures are leaving several European Social Security Systems in 
distress: declining fertility and increasing longevity would place public finances under 




pressure due to the rise of expenditures on age-related programs (pensions and health), 
causing unsustainable public debts, cuts in other type of important spending and large 
tax increases. Such events could reduce economic growth and, without a proportional 
reduction in interest rates, hamper reductions on debt-to-GDP ratio (Clements et al., 
2015).  
In Portugal, there are few studies about what influences the behaviour and 
evolution of Portuguese pensions expenditure and which link is established between 
pensions expenditure as dependent variable and other relevant explanatory variables, 
with the inclusion of the most recent developments on relevant variables, covering 
today´s Portuguese environment and data1. Then, it is crucial to determine the causes 
of that kind of relationship, how to handle the present situation and its implications in 
the following generations, and the right policies to adopt. Only such analysis allows to 
confirm or deny the existing conclusions, or even discover alternative ones. 
As such, this work aims to understand which variables have a relevant influence 
on social security pensions expenditure, providing some evidence about the impact of 
ageing on public finances and comparing the main arguments about this topic. 
Thereafter, the determination of the variables and its influence on pension expenditure 
will be measured and predicted using econometric techniques in order to bring an 
additional contribution and an alternative methodology in relation to previous studies. 
Chapter 2 explains the evolution of the Portuguese Social Security System. 
Chapter 3 presents some of the literature covering some projections and policy 
                                                             
1 Some exceptions are Andraz & Pereira (2012), Garcia & Lopes (2009), Garcia (2014), Martins (2014), 
Rodrigues (2015) and Castro et al. (2015). 




approaches about pensions, ageing and macroeconomic variables. Chapter 4 focuses on 
the data and methodology used. Chapter 5 explains the results. Chapter 6 concludes, 
showing the main limitations and comments on future researches related to this theme. 
2. The Portuguese Social Security System 
The First Social Security Act was published in 1984 (Decree-Law no. 28/84. 14th 
August), establishing a contributory regime (guaranteeing the protection to workers and 
their families in the case of disability, unemployment, death or family expenses) and a 
non-contributory regime (protecting individuals with lack of subsistent resources, not 
covered by the contributory regime). It is “an earnings-related public pension scheme 
with a means-tested safety net” (OECD, 2015, p. 325), where the contributory regime is 
financed by Social Security budget (mainly by contributions from workers and 
employers), while the non-contributory regime and social action are financed mainly by 
State budget transfers (Segurança Social, 2015). 
  Important legislation was implemented in the following years: 
- Decree-Law no. 140-D/86, 14th July - Contribution rates (TSU) are set to be paid 
by employees and employers in 11% and 24%2, respectively, of remuneration for 
work performed, being the percentage of 0,50% to finance the professional 
sickness benefit; 
- Decree-Law no. 259/89, 14th August – The Social Security Reserve Fund (FEFSS) 
was created in order to guarantee the financial stabilization of the social security 
system; 
                                                             
2 Today, contribution rates are 11% for employees and 23,75% for employers. 




- Decree-Law no. 514/90, 6th July – The attribution to retirees and pensioners of a 
14th month, making them equivalent (in number of payments) in relation to the 
majority of the active workers. 
- Decree-Law no. 329/93, 25th September – The reform of the juridical regime of 
old-age and disability pensions, which includes the standardization of the official 
retirement age of 65 years.3 
The Second Social Security Act was published in 2000 (Law no. 17/2000, 8th August), 
but was revoked by the Third Social Security Act in 2002 (Law no. 32/2002, 20th 
December) dividing the system into three subsystems: Social Security Public System, 
Social Support System and Complementary System4. It is equally important to refer the 
approval of Council of Ministers Resolution no. 110/2005, which intends to start the 
convergence of the Civil Servants Fund to the General Social Security System5. 
The Fourth Social Security Act (Law no 4/2007, 16th January) approved the general 
basis of the General Social Security System currently implemented, creating three 
subsystems: Citizenship Social Protection, Social Welfare System and Complementary 
System6. Moreover, the Decree-Law no. 187/2007 introduced a sustainability factor7, 
having into account the evolution of an increasing life expectancy, penalizing anticipated 
                                                             
3 However, it includes a “transitional period of six years for the gradual introduction of the measure that 
takes into account the higher life expectancy of women and the frequent existence of shorter careers” (Segurança 
Social, 2015). 
4 Sistema Público de Segurança Social, Sistema de Acção Social and Sistema Complementar, respectively 
(Segurança Social, 2015).  
5 General Social Security System encompasses the workers from private sector.  
6 Sistema de Proteção Social de Cidadania, Sistema Previdencial and Sistema Complementar, respectively 
(Segurança Social, 2015). 
7 Ratio between life expectancy at 65 years in 2006 (changed to 2000 by Decree-Law no. 167-E/2013) and 
the life expectancy at 65 years in the year before the request for retirement. 




retirements8. (Segurança Social, 2015). This reform, whose effects will mainly be felt in 
the medium and long term, intends to promote the sustainability of the public finances, 
reducing the value of future pensions expenditure relative to what had been expected 
prior to the reform and a subsequent decrease of replacement rates (Braz & Cunha, 
2012). It was aggravated in 2013 by the Decree-Law no. 167-E/2013. 
It is possible to verify that the changes suffered by the General Social Security System 
were caused mainly by social and political motivations from subsequent Governments. 
The 63rd Article of the Portuguese Constitution (the right to Social Security) assumes that 
the Social Security System is embodied by successive Social Security Acts which adjust 
the System to the national social and economic evolution (Segurança Social, 2015). 
In sum, Portugal presents a PAYG9 pension scheme10, when young workers agree to 
pay (out of their labour income) the pension of the retired people in return for the 
promise that the next generation does the same for them, and a Bismarckian system, 
trying to provide reasonable living standards after retirement, without additional 
arrangements (Blake, 2006)11. It is also a defined-benefit system (European Commission, 
2015), offering pensioners more measurable post-employment income benefits 
(Ramaswamy, 2012). The pension is indexed to prices and GDP and valorised in relation 
to prices (European Commission, 2015)12. 
                                                             
8 The Solidarity Extraordinary Contribution was also introduced in 2011 by Law no. 55-A/2010, 31st 
December, levied on all sorts of pension income, foreseeing their extinction in 2017.   
9 The first studies about social security were developed by Samuelson in 1958 and Aaron in 1966, arguing 
that PAYG systems can increase welfare if the sum of population growth rate with the rate of growth of productivity 
(real wages) is higher than the real interest rate (World Bank, 2006; Martins, 2014). 
10 Supplemented by a funded component: the FEFSS. 
11 Individual-voluntary private pension schemes in the private sector only exist to a minor extent in Portugal 
(European Parliament, 2011). 
12 “Valorisation rules define how pension contributions paid during the working life are indexed before 
retirement”, while “indexation of pensions in payment measures how the pension preserves its value over time” In 
European Commission (2015). 




A synthesis of the evolution of public pension expenditure is illustrated in the 
following figures: 
 
Source: PORDATA (2015). Values in Euros (at current prices). 
FIGURE 1 – EVOLUTION OF THE GENERAL SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION EXPENDITURES 
(ALL THE SUBSYSTEMS) AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL SOCIAL SECURITY (1984-
2014) 
 
Source: PORDATA (2015). Values in individuals. 
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According to Figure 1, it seems that the issue about the sustainability of Social 
Security management is overestimated: the contributions to General Social Security 
System have been higher than the expenditures with old-age, disability and survivor 
pensions since 1984, reaching a value of 13663 million euros in 2014, against a value of 
13277 million euros in expenditures in the same year, and both of them have presented 
an increasing trend. Moreover, the pensioners shown in Figure 2 has registered the 
same evolution, surpassing the value of 3.5 million in 201013, revealing the Social 
Security System maturation process and the accomplishment of its purpose. 
However, it can bring an additional pressure on the Government expenditures. 
Between 1995 and 2013, total public pension expenditure rose 6.5 p.p. (from 9.2% of 
GDP to 15.7%), representing one of the main factors accounting for the strong growth 
in primary spending (excluding other obvious factors such as unemployment or reduced 
economic growth), particularly after 2000 (Braz & Cunha, 2012; PORDATA, 2015). 
Furthermore, expenditures with social protection represent the biggest portion of total 
public expenditure (36.1% in 2015), surpassing the values for EU-28 Member States (on 
average)14 regularly since 2011 (PORDATA, 2015).  As such, it is required an attentive 
analysis in order to clarify these events and their impacts on public accounts. 
                                                             
13 It can also be explained by the successive incorporation of civil servants from Civil Servants Fund to the 
General Social Security System since 1st January 2006 (GEP/MSESS, 2015). 
14 34.3% in 2015 (PORDATA, 2015).   





Source: EUROSTAT (2016). Values in percentage of total. 
FIGURE 3 – GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE15 BY FUNCTION16 (1995-2014) 
Assessing Figure 3, the evidence shows that the expenditure with Social 
Protection has been the General Government most relevant expenditure (which is 
expected in Euro Area on average), and its percentage of total has verified an increasing 
trend, evolving from 27.1% in 1995 to 35.7% in 2014, following the evolution of the 
pension expenditures analysed previously, being the biggest type of expenditure during 
the referred time period. The increasing trend of social benefits (together with public 
consumption) helps to explain the growth of public expenditures, increasing from 42.6% 
of GDP in 1995 to 48.3% in 2015, illustrating the big weight of the Government on the 
overall economy (PORDATA, 2015; Santos et al., 2010).  
                                                             
15 It includes Central Government, Local Government and Social Security System. 
16 “Other expenditures” includes expenditure on environmental protection, housing and community 
amenities and recreation, culture and religion. “Defence” includes defence, public order and safety. “Public Debt 
Transactions” could be included in “General Public Services”, but it is separated in order to facilitate the analysis. 
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If public revenues are insufficient to cover expenditures, the deficit will be 
financed by the issuance of public debt (both for private agents as for the Central Bank), 
creating an additional burden over public finances. However, an expansionist fiscal 
policy and resulting deficit could generate a lower capital accumulation and subsequent 
crowding-out17 of private investment. Regarding private consumption, the future 
Government payment commitment in the future will demand more taxes. If consumers 
are not myopic (smoothing its consumption over time), the expectation of more taxes 
in the future will reduce private consumption now (Santos et al., 2010). 
Public debt transactions (the debt service) have registered values (10% in 2014) 
close to health and education expenditures (12.1% and 12% in 2014, respectively), with 
the repercussions highlighted previously, resulting on a difficult trade-off: lower interest 
rates and low taxes are needed to increase investment and economic growth, but it ends 
up worsening deficits in the short term, raising interest rates. Consequently, it is likely 
that the Government will have to cut the biggest expenditures, namely social transfers, 
health and education in order to balance public finances (Moniz et al., 2014)18.  
These facts arise an important analysis methodology of public expenditures: not 
only the size of expenditures are important but also its priorities and the following 
repercussions on the economy. 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Projections 
                                                             
17 The crowding-out effect is an increase of interest rates caused by an increase of public consumption 
financed by the issuance of public debt, reducing private investment (Santos et al., 2010). 
18 Piketty (2014) also highlighted this impact, reinforced the fact that a high economic growth followed by 
a proportional evolution of tax base in relation to debt interest rates can easily reduce the weight of public debt in 
percentage of GDP. 




According to the Bank of Portugal (2015), the financial unsustainability of Social 
Security System and its impact on public accounts are issues that have been motivated 
mostly by demographic changes, with social, economic and political implications. The 
dynamics of the resident population growth in Portugal since the beginning of the XXI 
Century is characterized by a reduction of both the natural balance and the net 
migration which have become negative, explained by the increasing burden of the 
central age groups. This can happen due to the fact that the increase of old people has 
been lower than the decrease of young people, resulting on higher unemployment rates 
(Castro et al., 2015). 
The progressive deterioration of ageing both the base and the top of the pyramid 
of ages, resulting from a decrease on the proportion of young people (under 15 years) 
and an increasing on the proportion of the elderly population (65 and over), 
respectively, illustrates the population dynamics in Portugal, reinforced by a low fertility 
(it has decreased from 3.20 children per women on average in 1960 to 1.23 in 2014 , 
illustrating a level of lowest-low fertility) that does not ensure the level of generational 
replacement (2.1 children per woman) and the recovery is not expected in the next forty 
years (Carrilho & Craveiro, 2014). Consequently, the potential sustainability index19 is 
expected to evolve from 330 in 2014 to 149 in 2060 (INE, 2014).  
The relevance of economic environment evolution over time on PAYG systems 
has also stressed by several authors. According to Piketty (2014), the PAYG pensions 
systems, applied during the half of XX Century, were developed having into account high 
                                                             
19 Number of people aged between 15 and 64 years in percentage of the number of people aged 65 or more 
years (INE, 2014). 




demographic growth and economic growth rates near 5% in Europe. Nowadays, the 
situation is different: the economic growth rate is 1.5% in rich countries, reducing at the 
same proportion the PAYG accrual rates. 
These developments will motivate capital outflows to developing countries with 
younger population20 (Domeij & Flodén, 2006). Ludwig et al. (2012) referred a beginning 
of a period of declining interest rates, increasing gross wages and decreasing 
replacement rates, possibly aggravating the financial burden of pay-as-you-go public 
pension systems. The impact on savings has been broadly discussed too, stressed by 
Feldstein (1974) who reinforced the life-cycle hypothesis: providing income during 
retirement, social security reduces savings during the working years, as well as capital 
accumulation due to the increased taxes/levies on workers to finance pensions, which 
reduces the total amount of physical capital that can be accumulated21. 
PAYG pension systems bring challenges to governments: in periods of economic 
crisis, followed by high unemployment, lower tax revenues and pension contributions 
received may require governments to temporarily fund pension payments by issuing 
public debt. While the ability of governments to honour their commitments on public 
pensions is usually taken for granted and the size of pension liabilities is not reported on 
sovereign balance sheets, the ability of guaranteeing its compliance is questioned, 
especially in long periods of economic shrinkage (Ramaswamy, 2012). 
                                                             
20 Obviously, the international capital are also dependent on other factors such as business cycle 
fluctuations, long-term growth trends and volatile fiscal policy (Domeij & Flodén, 2006). 
21 This idea was contested by Leimer and Lesnoy in 1982 (they found a programming error influenced 
Feldstein’s outcome) and Barro in 1974, who argues that savings were not reduced but were shifted to bequests 
(World Bank, 2006). 




Given these scenarios, it is important to have into consideration the trade-off 
between sustainability of public finances and its adequacy. Due to the population ageing 
and the public expenses increase, it could be inevitable to reduce benefits to 
accommodate for the problem. This is, however, very difficult with regard to adequacy, 
arising complaints that future pensioners will not receive enough income (European 
Parliament, 2011). However, these objectives can be complementary, to the extent that 
financial sustainability of a pension system is a necessary condition to ensure adequacy 
in a long time horizon (Chybalski & Marcinkiewicz, 2014). 
Cipriani (2013) tested an OLG model with PAYG pensions with exogenous fertility 
and other with endogenous fertility, and he concluded that “if the pension tax rate and 
the child-rearing cost are sufficiently high, a fall in fertility leads to an increase in 
pensions, but an increase in longevity always affects negatively the public pensions [in 
the first model]” (Cipriani, 2013, p. 254) and “if life expectancy increases, there is a fall 
in fertility, which reinforces the ageing of population, and there is a consequent fall in 
PAYG pensions [in the second model]” (Cipriani, 2013, p. 255). In other words, ageing 
and lower fertility can reduce the value of the pension paid to an old individual in 
addiction to an increase in the number of pensioners.  
The sensitivity of Social Security expenditures in relation to these kind of 
phenomena is also highlighted in several studies. Andraz & Pereira (2012) referred that 
the component of the social security budget sensitive to the business cycle (that is, the 
evolution of GDP) is about 30% of the total spending, including mostly unemployment 
benefits and different types of social action spending, which illustrates its strong 
vulnerability in relation to other factors beyond economic ones. Moreover, they used a 




VAR model and data for the period 1970-200722 and they concluded that the possible 
increases on Social Security total spending23 bring negative effects on both labour 
markets and financial markets, caused by higher unit labour costs, higher 
unemployment rates and  lower saving rates, resulting on a negative impact on GDP 
(marginal product of 2.40, 1.70, -0.28 and -2.90, respectively24).  
The European Commission Ageing Report (2015) also stressed several 
demographic impacts (and economic ones) on Portuguese public pension expenditures 
to GDP: 
TABLE I -  AGEING REPORT SENSITIVITY TESTS (2013-2060) 
Scenarios Impact on 
Pensions/GDP 
The Biggest Impact in 
European Union? 
An increase of life expectancy at birth. + 1 p.p.25 Yes 
20% less net migration. + 0.25 p.p. No 
A higher employment rate of older workers (for 
age group 55-74) of 10 p.p., introduced up until 
2025. 
- 0.7 p.p. No 
A higher employment rate (for age group 20-64) 
of 2 p.p.. 
- 0.3 p.p. No 
A permanent increase of 0.25 p.p. in the labour 
productivity growth rate. 
- 1 p.p. No 
A permanent decrease of 0.25 p.p. in the labour 
productivity growth rate. 
+ 1 p.p. Yes 
A lower Total Factor Productivity growth - 
convergence to 0.8% in 2060 compared to 1% in 
the baseline scenario. 
+ 1.2 p.p. Yes 
An automatic link between early and statutory 
retirement ages and life expectancy, starting 
from the base year. 
- 0.35 p.p. No 
 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
                                                             
22 This analysis does not encompass the reforms applied in 2007. 
23 It encompasses retirement pensions for both private and public sector employees, their dependents and 
their survivors, as well as unfunded social benefits and social assistance programs. 
24 With an increase of 1 percentage point (p.p). on the ratio of social security spending to GDP, the unit 
labour costs increase 2.40 p.p., the unemployment rate increases 1.70 p.p., the saving rate decreases -0.28 p.p. and 
the GDP decreases 2.90 p.p.. 
25 An increase of life expectancy at birth (of 2 years by 2060 compared to the baseline 
projection) will cause an increase of 1 p.p. on public pension expenditure change over 2013-2060. This 
explanation remains in relation to the other scenarios. 




In spite of the existence of a sustainability factor in Portuguese public pension 
system which provides an automatic pension spending stabilization, the impact of an 
increase of life expectancy at birth is extremely high, but the impacts caused by changes 
in employment (less pensioners, less pensions and less inactive population, causing a 
positive effect on GDP growth) and productivity are more significant in these sensitivity 
tests, intensified by the fact that Portuguese pensions are not fully indexed to wages 
after retirement, and consequently higher labour productivity growth leads to a faster 
GDP and labour income growth than pension growth. Through the analysis of this 
impact, the overall effect projected is a decrease of gross public pension expenditure in 
Portugal of 0.7 p.p. in period 2013-2060 (European Commission, 2012; 2015; Portugal 
Stability Program, 2015). The OECD Pensions at a Glance (2015) reinforces these 
projections, highlighting the importance of demographic factors such as the old-age 
dependency ratio, projecting an increase of 38.1 p.p. for Portugal between 2015 and 
2050. Nevertheless, cuts in benefits for future retirees, through lower indexation and 
valorisation or benefit formulae with increases in the minimum age allowed to claim 
pension benefits, will reduce growth in public pension expenditure. Hence, these 
measures can act as stabilizers of effects of ageing.   
The Bank of Portugal (2015) has also addressed the demographic transition in 
Portugal and its connections with economic growth, using a growth accounting 
approach and a Cobb-Douglas production function logarithm with isolated demographic 
evolution impact. The projections highlighted an extremely negative impact of pure 
demographic evolution (measured by the ratio between 15-64 population and total 
population) on GDP per capita until 2050. However, it is expected that the contribution 




of human capital (with an average number of schooling years reaching 11 in 2060 caused 
by a catching-up effect in relation to other developed countries) largely offsets the 
negative contribution of pure demographics during this period. In cumulative terms, 
their contribution amounts to 16.9 p.p. in 2050 and 18.2 p.p. in 2060. With regard to the 
employment rate, its contribution is particularly strong during the first ten years, 
reflecting a reduction of 14.8% of unemployment rate in 2015 to 8.9% in 2025. Later, 
this contribution becomes relatively small, such as the activity rate over the entire 
period. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the adverse impact on growth 
resulting from demographic trends will coexist with a favourable impact of the higher 
qualification of the workforce (Bank of Portugal, 2015). 
According to these sensitivity tests, population dynamics and productivity of 
labour assumes a huge relevance on public pension expenditures. Using the Solow 
production function, Castro et al. (2015) concluded that all the countries deal with a 
possible slowdown of technical progress, converted into the quality of life. 
Consequently, and dealing with a stagnation of the Portuguese population, it is expected 
a positive rate of growth of technical progress (in a broad sense) of 1.5% (European 
Commission, 2015; Castro et al., 2015) and a GDP per capita growth until 1.4-1.5% over 
the whole period 2013-2060 in European Union, with a possibility of countries like 
Portugal being affected by country specificities, such as cyclical developments, periods 
of (protracted) economic adjustment and catching-up effects (European Commission, 
2015). 
3.2. Policy Approach 




The change of demographic pattern has arisen an inversion of the relationship 
between demography and economics: from ancient times to nowadays, the issue is to 
know how economic growth allows the increase of population and, more recently, the 
living standards; in the future, policy makers will need to know whether the 
demographic evolution allows the continuation of economic growth (Castro et al., 
2015). 
Halmosi (2014) highlights that all European Union Member States, facing ageing 
and the 2008 economic crisis, applied quick and drastic measures which did not favour 
systemic pension reforms; in fact, some studies referred that ageing can contribute to a 
possible future financial crisis. In the Portuguese case, which came to the crisis with 
reformed systems that were supposed to deal with increases in spending (sustainability 
factors and longevity indexation), should set up further reforms (Grech, 2015), needing 
additional measures pointed by several authors such as the reduction of current 
benefits26. Assessing the impact of pension cuts in Portugal, Spain and Italy, opinions 
differ: Matsaganis et al (2014) present evidence that pension cuts had a varied 
distributional impact, being some of these changes progressive. By contrast, Natali & 
Stamanti (2014) refer that expenditure control measures jeopardize the future 
adequacy, causing problems of inequality, risk individualization and increasing 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
Assuming macroeconomic impacts on a PAYG Portuguese Social Security system, 
Garcia & Lopes (2009) argued that some measures such as a changing of indexing rules, 
                                                             
26 These measures are susceptible to cause social conflicts due to the low average pension values, justifying 
its unconstitutionality in Portugal (Pedroso, 2014; PORDATA, 2015). 




a better actuarial match between pensions and contributions and measures to increase 
the effective age of retirement could have a bigger impact on reducing the expected 
increase in pension expenditure, and applying a pension reform in isolation can only 
have a less effective impact on reducing it. Using a macroeconomic model of the 
Portuguese economy, the tests suggest that the elimination of early retirement schemes 
combined with an increase in effective contribution rate could be a good alternative, 
promoting the financial sustainability of the Social Security System and economic 
growth strengthened by a reserve fund (such as Social Security Reserve Fund, which 
presents an average annual nominal rate of return of 5.17% during the period 1989-
2014 with relatively low administrative costs  compared with other public pension 
reserve funds), bringing more advantages in relation to a fully pre-funded system (Garcia 
& Lopes,  2009; Garcia, 2014; IGFCSS, 2014), with too much high transition costs such as 
the payment by current tax payers of both existing pensioners and again to fund their 
own pensions (European Parliament, 2011). 
These transition costs and the challenges associated to the maintenance of a 
PAYG pensions system have motivated an important question: could a pensions system 
be left to voluntary decisions and private insurance, with no need for government 
involvement? Barr & Diamond (2006) argued that such possibilities are insufficient: 
firstly, economic agents have to deal with imperfect information, missing markets, risk, 
uncertainty and progressive taxation, which should be attenuated by public 
intervention. Secondly, public policy cares about poverty relief and redistribution 
beyond improving consumption smoothing and insurance. 




Nevertheless, highlighting the advantages of a possible transition of the system, 
the European Parliament (2011) reinforced that the PAYG pension systems can be 
advantageous during periods of economic growth, but, being economic growth a 
function of the rise in productivity, the amount of capital employed and the size of the 
workforce, if the latter decreases, it will be harder for the real economy to grow in the 
foreseeable future. Besides, PAYG financing encompasses higher transfers of wealth 
from future to present generations due to the increase of contribution rates in order to 
match current pension expenditures in relation to funded systems, where the return of 
fund´s assets reduces the required amount of contributions (Van den Noord & Herd, 
1993). 
So, financial markets seem to be a good alternative, to the extent that it is 
possible to find higher returns than the contribution from the growth in the real 
economy: the differences between the average rate of return of capital (between 4.5% 
and 5% in the XXI Century) and economic rate of growth (1.5%) reinforce this point. 
However, Piketty (2014) added an important critique: in spite of the rates of return in 
the financial markets (capital rates of return) surpass the wage progress, the wage 
evolution is 5 to 10 times less volatile, turning the total application of contributions on 
financial markets too risky27. 
Concerning possible pension reforms, Diamond (1996) suggested an indexation 
of normal retirement age to life expectancy28 and the investment of part of the trust 
                                                             
27 The 30´s Great Depression and 2008 financial crisis are sound examples of this volatility, generating big 
losses for those who applied great amounts of retirement contributions on financial markets (Piketty, 2014). 
28 This measure was already implemented in Portugal: the normal retirement age was 66 years in 2014, but 
It will increase to 66 years and two months in 2015, following the automatic process of adjusting the normal age of 
retirement by two-thirds of gains in life expectancy from age 65 measured as the average of the previous two years. 
(OECD, 2015). 




funds in the private economy (taking advantage of higher rates of return with caution in 
relation to higher risks comparing to government bonds, which present greater 
liquidity29). On the contrary, replacing part of Social Security with individual accounts 
leads to high administrative costs and higher taxation, and replacing all of Social Security 
with individual or firm mandates seems to be expensive, caused by administrative costs, 
problems of cashing-out or bad investment decisions (Diamond, 1996). Regarding the 
evolution of life expectancy, evidence from other countries like Spain suggests that the 
sustainability factor should be linked to other factors such as employment or 
dependency rates, and not only to life expectancy, in order to clarify which can really 
influence the financial health of the pension system. Reinforcing such factor, increasing 
the retirement age, extending the pension calculation period and increasing the number 
of contribution years required to be entitled to 100% of the regulatory base, can stabilize 
pension expenditure, at least during the application of such reforms (Doménech & de la 
Fuente, 2011).  
Measuring some policy measures to stress the fiscal challenge of shrinking 
populations, Clements et al. (2015) studied the impact of some policies in developed 
and undeveloped countries. The evidence suggests that encouraging bigger birth rates 
could reduce the evolution of ageing and fiscal costs, but the effects seem to be modest 
for most countries. Pro-migration policies would reduce age-related expenditures on 
long-term, but it is not enough to extinguish the impact of ageing in more developed 
countries. Raising labour force participation rates (especially for women and older 
                                                             
29 However, government bonds are subject to lower rates of return and vulnerability in relation to certain 
macroeconomic phenomena such as rapid inflation (Diamond, 1996). 




workers) can increase production increasing the workforce, which would mitigate or at 
least delay some of the projected impact from ageing. At last, some measures such as 
raising retirement ages, reducing pensions relative to wages, increasing taxation of 
pensions for upper income groups and increasing pension contributions could promote 
the sustainability of public pensions and it should start now, although gradually so. 
More recently, using a dynamic general equilibrium model  (with an OLG à la 
Blanchard-Yaari30 and hand-to-mouth pensioners to simulate the Portuguese 
demographic structure), the European Central Bank (2015) tested the impact of a two-
year increase in the retirement age, a permanent cut in the pension replacement ratio 
by 15% and an increase in the consumption tax by 1 p.p.. The first measure can reduce 
the share of old-age pensioners and increase overall social security contributions, 
enlarging their base and stabilising the impact of the ageing population on labour supply, 
per capita consumption and real GDP31. The second measure produces better results 
than the first one, because cuts in the replacement ratio reduce the old-age pension 
expenditure, the government spending and the required increases in social security 
contribution rates (combined with the first measure, the overall impact of ageing can be 
positive in the short run, and close to nil over the medium run). The third measure does 
not provide significant evidence.  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data Description 
                                                             
30 See also Blake (2006). 
31 This measure cannot act solely (European Central Bank, 2015). 




In order to stress which variables have a relevant influence on the Portuguese 
social security system pension expenditure, the chosen ones were selected having into 
account the studies analysed previously, particularly the European Commission Ageing 
Report (2015). As the analysis will be developed in the Portuguese case, only time series 
data will be used in this work. 
The dependent variable that will be stressed is pension spending by General 
Social Security System on elderly, disability and survival support as a share of GDP at 
current prices (pensions_to_gdp). It is a smaller component of total pension 
expenditures analysed by the European Commission Ageing Report (2015), OECD 
Pensions at a Glance (2015) and Chybalski (2014), but with more available yearly 
observations. The time-series data from 1975-2014 was chosen as a result of the 
limitations concerning the absence of more available observations during the research.  
Regarding the possible factors affecting the level of pension expenditures, and 
the availability of statistical data, the following explanatory variables were organised in 
groups: 
TABLE II – BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES32 33 
 
                                                             
32 The Lun15_64 and LAPL variables are presented in a logarithmic form in order to normalize and smooth 
the deviations and to help the coefficients interpretation, identified with L. 
33 The dummy variables assume the value 1 after the structural changes not only to measure their impacts 
in the following years, but also in order to avoid problems concerning the econometric specifications. 
Group  Variables Description Unit Source
Demographics OAD Old age dependence Index Percentage PORDATA (2015)
Labor Market Lun15_64 Logarithm of unemployed persons aged 15 to 64 Individuals PORDATA (2015)
Domestic Product LAPL Logarithm of apparent productivity of labor Ratio PORDATA (2015); OECD (2016)
Dummie rev1974 Revolution of April 1974 1 between 1975 and 1979; 0 otherwise Andraz & Pereira (2012)
Dummie r1984 First Social Security Act 1 since 1985; 0 otherwise Andraz & Pereira (2012)
Dummie r1993 1993 Social Security Reform 1 since 1994; 0 otherwise Andraz & Pereira (2012)
Dummie r2002 Third Social Security Act 1 since 2003, 0 otherwise Andraz & Pereira (2012)
Dummie r2007 Fourth Social Security Act 1 since 2008; 0 otherwise Andraz & Pereira (2012)




TABLE III – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
The OAD (number of elderly persons aged 65 and over per 100 persons of 
working age - from 15 to 64 years old) quantifies the impact of demography through the 
connection between old age and working age on pensions_to_gdp (European 
Commission, 2015).  
The un15-6434 (all individuals aged between 15 and 64 years old without job and 
available for work, having actively sought paid or unpaid work in the last 30 days, on 
strict sense) can be useful to stress the impact of unemployment on pensions. In PAYG 
systems, the unemployment contributes for the unsustainability of pension systems, 
shrinking the contribution base, at least in the short term (European Commission, 2015).  
The APL (real GDP in terms of expenditure at constant prices of 2011 per annual 
hours worked by employed people), as stressed by Castro et al. (2015), can present 
enough potential to overcome the negative effects of ageing. 
                                                             
34 This variable is a proxy of unemployment in the absence of more available data concerning the 
unemployment rate. 




Regarding dummy variables, Andraz & Pereira (2012) analysed the possible 
existence of four structural breaks during this sample period: Revolution of April 1974 
(important social and economic changes during the second half of the 70´s), First Social 
Security Act of 1984 (the great expansion of beneficiaries and more generosity 
concerning the benefits), the Social Security Reform of 1993 (equality between women 
and men in relation to the retirement age and several changes in pension calculation) 
and the Third Social Security Act of 2002 (revocation of the Second Social Security Act in 
2000, concerning new changes of pension calculation and a new General Social Security 
institutional organization). In this work, the significance of these structural breaks will 
be also analysed, adding the Fourth Social Security Act in 2007 (introduction of the 
sustainability factor, which introduced an important change on pension calculation 
concerning the increasing of life expectancy). 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are specified in Table III. 
If the purpose is to analyse the relationship between several variables using a 
regression model, it is important to assume some stability through time: if this 
relationship was arbitrary in each period, it would not be possible to know how a 
variable affects another only with a unique process realization (Wooldridge, 2009). To 
test for stationarity, the conduction of unit root tests is needed. 
TABLE IV – UNIT ROOT AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER AND PHILLIPS-PERRON 
TEST´S RESULTS  
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
Variables Deterministic Component P-Value T-Stat Deterministic Component P-Value Adj. T-Stat
pensions_to_gdp constant and trend 0.4379 -2.273162 constant and trend         0.2874 -2.588373
lapl constant and trend 0.8648 -1.332065 constant and trend 0.8274 -1.456712
lun1564 constant and trend 0.3919 -2.362997 constant and trend 0.6949 -1.780441
oad constant and trend 0.9818 -0.448775 constant and trend 0.9986  0.414222
Phillips-Perron TestDickey-Fuller Test





TABLE V - UNIT ROOT AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER AND PHILLIPS-PERRON TEST´S 
RESULTS WITH FIRST DIFFERENCES 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
Following the methodology adopted by Brooks (2014), the chosen tests were the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test (Table IV and V). The p-values 
analysis of both tests suggests that the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root 
cannot be rejected in all variables at 10% significance level, but the stationarity is 
achieved with first differences through the rejection of the same null hypothesis at 5% 
significance level, highlighting their strong persistence (I(1) process).  
4.2. Adopted Methodology 
To estimate the impact of Lun15_64, LAPL and OAD on pensions_to_gdp, it is 
intended to stress the following function: 
(1) 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑡𝑜_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑢𝑛15_64𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝑃𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑟𝑒𝑣1974𝑡
+ 𝛿1𝑟1984𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑟1993𝑡 +  𝛿3𝑟2002𝑡 + 𝛿42007𝑡  
The finding of non-stationarity may turn the potential econometric results 
statistically invalid. Typically, the linear combination of I(1) variables will be I(1), but it is 
desirable to obtain I(0) residuals which are only achieved if the linear combination of I(1) 
variables will be I(0), that is, if the variables are cointegrated (Brooks, 2014). 
Variables Deterministic Component P-Value T-Stat Deterministic Component P-Value Adj. T-Stat
pensions_to_gdp constant 0 -6.227754 constant 0 -6.239673
lapl constant and trend 0.0166 -4.013996 constant and trend 0.0166 -4.013996
lun1564 none 0.0002 -3.971594 none  0.0002 -3.971594
oad constant and trend 0.0045 -4.533609 constant and trend 0.004 -4.580826
Phillips-Perron TestDickey-Fuller Test




Regarding the hypothesis of the existence of more than one linearly independent 
cointegration relationship between more than two variables, it is appropriate to stress 
the issue of cointegration using the Johansen VAR test, as recommended by Brooks 
(2014). 
To develop the Johansen VAR framework, the selection of the optimum number 
of lags is needed to avoid problems of residual autocorrelation, using the VAR Lag Order 
Selection Criteria (Table VII). The Likelihood Ratio Criteria (LR), Final Predictor Error (FPE) 
and Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQ) selected two lags as an optimum limit, 
against the evidence of Akaike Information Criteria and Schwarz Information Criteria 
(SC), which presented the optimum selection of three and one lag, respectively.  
The Johansen Cointegration Test allows to select the appropriate lag length and 
model to choose (Table VIII and IX), and the evidence suggests that the number of 
appropriated lags is two (as referred before) with one cointegrating vector, and the 
model to adopt consists on the allowance of a quadratic deterministic trend, with 
intercept and trend in the cointegration equation and intercept in VAR, following Akaike 
Information Criteria (Brooks, 2014). 
It was decided to use an error correction model “incorporated” into a VAR 
framework in order to model the short and long run relationships between variables: a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The VECM can be set up in the following form 
(Brooks, 2014):  
(2) ∆𝛾𝑡 = П𝛾𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛤1∆𝛾𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑘−1∆𝛾𝑡−(𝑘−1) + 𝑢𝑡35 
                                                             
35 П= (Σ𝑖=1
𝑘 𝛽𝑖) − 𝐼𝑔 and 𝛤𝑖 = (𝛴𝑗=1
𝑖 𝛽𝑗) − 𝐼𝑔 




This VECM is composed by first differenced g variables on the LHS, and k-1 lags 
of the dependent variables (differences) on the RHS, each with a Γ short-run coefficient 
matrix. П consist on a long-run coefficient matrix, since in equilibrium, all ∆𝛾𝑡−𝑖 = 0, and 
establishing 𝑢𝑡  with the expected value of zero it implies that П𝑦𝑡−𝑘= 0. П illustrates the 
speed of adjustment back to equilibrium, that is, it measures the proportion of last 
period´s equilibrium error that is corrected for (Brooks, 2014). 
The VECM model is illustrated in Table XI36. Figure 8 shows that the model is 
stable, because all inverse roots of characteristic polynomial are inside the unit circle. 
The residuals assumptions were tested, and it is possible to verify that the mean 
of the residuals is almost zero (Table XII), the White Heteroskedasticity Test p-value does 
not allow the rejection of homoskedastic residuals (Table XIII), the covariance between 
residuals and explanatory variables are almost zero, satisfying the assumption of no 
relationship between them (Table XIV), the residuals are normally distributed (Table XV) 
and the null hypothesis of no residual serial correlation is not rejected at 5% significance 
level with the use of two lags (Table XVI).  
As such, the estimators are efficient, and the confidence intervals and hypothesis 
tests using t and F-statistics are reliable. 
5. Results 
5.1. Cointegration Equation 
The presence of a cointegrating vector illustrates an equilibrium phenomenon, 
since it is possible that cointegrating variables may deviate from their relationship in the 
                                                             
36 The analysed VECM model encompasses the cointegration equation with dummy variables. 




short run, but their association would return in the long run (Brooks, 2014). Then, it 
exists a long-run relationship between the analysed variables, illustrated by the 
following normalized cointegrating model, without dummy variables37: 
(3) pensions_to_gdp= 1.320370 Lun15_64 + 1.818858 LAPL - 0.221652 OAD  
                                            (0.16300)     (0.93573) (0.08153) 
At first sight, it is admissible to think that in Equation 3 the long-run relationship 
between OAD and pensions_to_gdp does not make sense. The negative coefficient 
induces that, with the remain variables constant, an increase of 1 p.p. in OAD will cause 
a decrease of 0.221652 p.p. on pension expenditure to GDP on average, seeming to be 
contradictory: how the increase of old people (or the decrease of young people) can 
cause a decrease of pension expenditure as a share of GDP?  
It is possible to extract some possible interpretations from the negative OAD 
long-run coefficient. Assuming that in the future old people will work more years due to 
several factors such as the indexation of the official retirement age to life expectancy or 
an individual option to work beyond the retirement age, an increase of old people does 
not compulsorily imply an increase of pension expenditure as a share of GDP in the long 
run, contradicting the mainstream literature about pension spending and other research 
sources such as OECD (2015) and European Commission (2015).  
In fact, the indexation of the official retirement age to life expectancy has been 
supported by several authors analysed before such as Clements et al. (2015) or Diamond 
(1996) as a crucial measure to guarantee the financial sustainability of Social Security, 
smoothing the impact of an ever increasing number of pensioners. Moreover, if the 
                                                             
37 Standard errors in parenthesis. 




knowledge and accumulated experience provided by old people were exploited in an 
industrialized society as referred by Rosa (1996), it would be possible to increase the 
effective retirement age, extending the contributory career. Other possible reason can 
be the fact that ageing can have a stronger impact on the pension value than on GDP in 
the long run, which can be explained by successive reforms reducing pension 
entitlements such as the sustainability factor, that is, in spite of Portuguese pensions are 
not fully indexed to wages after retirement (European Commission, 2015), the applied 
reforms by Portuguese Government cause a bigger reduction on pension payments than 
a probable reduction on GDP caused by ageing (Andraz & Pereira, 2012). 
The remaining long-run coefficients seem to be reliable. The positive long-run 
coefficient of Lun15_64 shows that, letting the remain variables constant, an increase 
of 1% on unemployed people aged between 15 and 64 years old causes an increase of 
1.320370/100 = 0.01320370 p.p. on pension expenditure to GDP on average, 
corroborating the common interpretation about the negative effect of unemployment 
on any pension system supported by the analysed authors. High unemployment leads 
to negative migratory balances (affecting mostly the young people), aggravating the 
ageing process and consequently the demographic declining. With less people, the 
investment decreases, shrinking the economic growth38 (Castro et al., 2015) 
Regarding the LAPL long-run coefficient, the evidence suggests that, letting the 
remain variables constant, an increase of 1% on APL results on an increase of 
1.818858/100 = 0.01818858 p.p. on pension expenditure to GDP on average. It implies 
                                                             
38 The causality from ageing and unemployment to productivity are confirmed by a VEC Granger Causality 
Test, at 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. However, it was not included for a matter of space. 




that APL has a stronger impact on pension growth than GDP growth, contradicting the 
European Commission (2015) approach. Nevertheless, these results reinforce the 
importance of APL on pension growth and support the hypothesis that, in the future, 
the transfer rate from wages to pensions will increase, being that structural change a 
requirement when the ratio between old people and people of working age increases 
significantly (Castro et al., 2015). 
The fact that OAD presents a negative relationship with pensions_to_gdp arises 
the hypothesis of a spurious result. As such, it was developed a Johansen Cointegration 
Test with dummy variables (Table X), with the problem that critical values may not be 
valid with exogenous series such as dummy variables. With this new test, the OAD long-
run coefficient is positive and the sign of the remain coefficients does not change, that 
is, an increase on OAD causes an increase on pensions_to_gdp as has been supported 
by the analysed authors, turning the results more credible: less contributions combined 
with an indirect negative impact on potential economic growth through the decrease of 
labour supply increase the burden of pension expenditures to GDP (Portugal Stability 
Program, 2015). However, it is important to have into account the econometric 
limitations of this change. 
5.2. VECM Model Coefficients 
To derive the VECM p-values, it was developed the VECM model with the 
coefficients as C(1) until C(16) (Table XVII). C(1) is the coefficient of the cointegration 
equation (as well as the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium), C(10) is the constant, 
C(2) until C(9) are the short-run coefficients of the lagged variables (until the second lag) 




and C(12) until C(16) are the coefficients of the dummy variables. C(11) is the trend 
coefficient (Brooks, 2014). 
Looking at C(1), it is negative and statistically significant at 5%, confirming the 
long-run relationship between pensions_to_gdp, Lun15_64, LAPL and OAD and the 
existence of a correction mechanism of deviations (Wooldridge, 2009). Developing the 
Wald Tests (Table XVIII), it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of C(4)=C(5)=0, 
C(6)=C(7)=0 and C(8)=C(9)=0, and the conclusion to be stressed is the absence of short-
run causality running from Lun15_64, OAD and LAPL to pensions_to_gdp. 
Regarding the short-run coefficients of the dummy variables, only the revolution 
of April 1974 (at 10% significance level) and the 1993 Social Security Reform (at 5%) 
present statistical significance, and the negative coefficients illustrate each contribution 
to the decrease of pension expenditure as a share of GDP: the possible causes can be 
the high average real GDP growth rate after 1976 until 1979 of 5.4% in the first case 
(PORDATA, 2015) and the implementation of the same official retirement age between 
men and women, as well as the increase of the minimum contributory period from 10 
to 15 years in the latter case (Segurança Social, 2015) . 
5.3. Impulse – Response Functions 
At last, it was stressed the impulse-response functions and the variance 
decomposition for pensions_to_gdp, strongly dependent of the Cholesky ordering 
which does not follow a specific requirement (Brooks, 2014). In order to guarantee some 
consistency and reasonability of the results, it was considered that the order will be from 




the most exogenous variable to the most endogenous one, determined by a VEC 
Granger Causality Test39.  
The adopted order is as follows: OAD, Lun15_64, pensions_to_gdp and LAPL. 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
FIGURE 4 – RESPONSE TO CHOLESKY ONE STANDARD DEVIATION INNOVATION 
Following Brooks (2014) methodology, Figure 4 gives the impulse responses for 
pensions_to_gdp, regarding several unit shocks to OAD and Lun15_64 and their impact 
during 20 periods (years) ahead. Considering the signs of the responses, innovations to 
OAD have a positive impact until the 5th year, achieving its peak in the 3rd year. After 
that, the impact is negative, but the effect of the shock ends up dying down. A standard 
deviation shock to Lun15_64 and LAPL has always a positive impact on pensions_to_gdp, 
reaching its peak in the 4th and 3rd year, respectively, stagnating in the long-run. At last, 
the own innovations to pensions_to_gdp register a similar impact in relation to 
Lun15_64, that is, reaches the peak in the 4th year and a stagnation thereafter. 
                                                             
39 The higher the p-value, the greater the exogeneity of the variable. The other ordering possibilities were 
not included in this work for a matter of space. 




Analysing this approach, the main highlight is the fact that OAD registers an 
almost irrelevant contribution for the evolution of pensions_to_gdp in the long-run 
comparing with the remain variables, surpassed by the contributions of Lun15_64 and 
LAPL, reinforcing the doubts about the contribution of ageing on pension expenditures.  
It is also possible to verify the relevance of unemployment in the presence of a positive 
shock immediately in the first years (as stressed by the European Commission (2015)) 
and in a 20-year forecasting horizon (positive but constant impact), shrinking the 
contributory base and the economic growth, and a similar pattern in relation to the 
apparent productivity of labour, guaranteeing higher pension entitlements. 
5.4. Variance Decomposition 
TABLE VI – VARIANCE FOR THE PENSIONS_TO_GDP RESIDUALS 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
Accessing Table VI, it is possible to verify that, in the 20-year forecasting horizon, 
the OAD shocks account for only around between 2.86% and 5.35% of the variance of 
the pensions_to_gdp and Lun15_64 contributes between 57.87% and 85.83%, 
Years Ahead pensions_to_gdp Lun15_64 LAPL OAD St. Errors
1  39.75548  57.38656  0.000000  2.857965  0.120497
2  14.08738  81.98100  1.800683  2.130935  0.206266
3  6.506829  86.96445  4.916684  1.612034  0.303806
4  4.121266  87.13196  5.941479  2.805292  0.390854
5  3.155232  86.14967  6.969393  3.725705  0.449405
6  2.681086  85.39148  7.331064  4.596374  0.490008
7  2.405232  85.04415  7.550595  5.000024  0.518948
8  2.194605  85.06123  7.564982  5.179188  0.544869
9  2.021894  85.24482  7.580635  5.152655  0.571267
10  1.835527  85.49395  7.565629  5.104890  0.600105
11  1.667450  85.65787  7.609152  5.065524  0.629854
12  1.523000  85.72672  7.655780  5.094500  0.659096
13  1.404929  85.72433  7.721031  5.149708  0.686239
14  1.307722  85.70800  7.765147  5.219132  0.711306
15  1.227116  85.70338  7.801512  5.267990  0.734649
16  1.156579  85.72203  7.820927  5.300469  0.757110
17  1.093640  85.75321  7.838002  5.315151  0.779112
18  1.035675  85.78749  7.851151  5.325681  0.800913
19  0.982888  85.81437  7.867364  5.335376  0.822386
20  0.934854  85.83266  7.883034  5.349449  0.843404




reinforcing the huge importance of unemployment on pension expenditure and the 
reduced impact of ageing comparing with the remain variables. It is also important to 
stress the own shocks of pensions_to_gdp, which accounts between 0.93% and 39.76% 
of its movements40. 
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
Regarding the VECM model and the results obtained (taking into consideration 
certain aspects such as non-stationarity, cointegration and residuals testing), the 
evidence suggests that unemployment, apparent productivity of labour and old-age 
dependence index jointly present a long-run relationship with pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP, but not in the short-run. 
The unemployment is crucial to explain the increase of pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP, as reinforced by the analysed authors and the mainstream literature about 
pensions. This interpretation is illustrated by the variance decomposition of 
pensions_to_gdp and the impulse-response functions. 
The apparent productivity of labour has also a positive impact on pension 
expenditure to GDP according to the results stressed in this work, conflicting with 
studies stressed by the European Commission (2015), which supports the assumption 
that GDP growth is bigger than pension growth in Portugal due to the fact that the 
Portuguese pensions are not fully indexed to wages after retirement.  
                                                             
40 These results, however, need to be analysed carefully: if the order of variables changes, the results of 
impulse-response functions and variance decomposition can change drastically, mainly the variance decomposition  
between pensions_to_gdp and Lun15_64. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the unemployment strongly influences 
the pension expenditure behaviour.  




The most intriguing result concerns the old-age dependence index: after the 
development of one Johansen Cointegration Test without dummy variables and other 
with dummy variables, the OAD long-run coefficient presents different signs, arising the 
hypothesis that ageing may not be a “catastrophic” factor which jeopardizes the 
financial sustainability of the Portuguese Social Security System (as Castro et al. (2015) 
pointed out). This fact is corroborated by the almost irrelevant influence of OAD (in the 
long-run) on the impulse-response-functions, but the empirical evidence found by the 
majority of the analysed authors contests such conclusion.  
This overall analysis needs to be assessed with caution since this work presents 
some limitations, such as a small time series (40 years) and different results regarding 
the different econometric techniques adopted, and challenges concerning the choice of 
the appropriate variables to determine the impacts stressed by the analysed literature 
and the choice of a suitable econometric model to take the statistical characterization 
of the variables into account. 
Further research on this topic could be, for instance, the choice of different 
explanatory variables or a different econometric model to see if the previous results still 
hold, a profound study assessing the impact of ageing on Portuguese pension 
expenditures (in order to clarify the doubts arisen in this work) in the long-run and a 
deep analysis about the role of the apparent productivity of labour as a possible 









- Andraz, J. M. & Pereira, A. M. (2012). Social security and economic performance 
in Portugal: after all that has been said and done how much has actually changed? 
Journal of Population Economics. Vol. 11. pp. 83-100; 
- Bank of Portugal (2015). Boletim Económico – Outubro 2015 (Online). Available 
from: http://www.bportugal.pt/pt-
PT/EstudosEconomicos/Publicacoes/BoletimEconomico/Publicacoes/Bol_econ_out201
5.pdf (Accessed: 18/12/2015); 
- Barr, N. & Diamond, P. (2006) The economics of pensions. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 22. No 1. pp. 15-39; 
- Blake, D. (2006). Pension Economics. John Wiley & Sons; 
- Braz, C. & Cunha, J. C. (2012). The Evolution of Public Expenditure: Portugal in 
the Euro Area Context. Banco de Portugal-Economic Bulletin. pp. 21-37; 
- Brooks, C. (2014). Introductory econometrics for finance. 3rd Ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 
- Carone, G., Costello, D., Guardia, N. D., Mourre, G., Przywara, B. and Salomaki, 
A. (2005). The economic impact of ageing populations in the EU25 Member States 
(Online). Available from: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance (Accessed: 
24/12/2015); 
- Carrilho, M. & Craveiro, M. (2015). A situação demográfica recente em Portugal. 
Revista de Estudos Demográficos, No 54; 
- Castro, E., Martins, J. M. and Silva, C. J. (2015). A Demografia e o País: Previsões 
Cristalinas sem Bola de Cristal. 1st Ed. Lisbon: Gradiva; 




- Chybalski, F. (2014) Financial Stability of Pension Systems: A Cross-Country 
Analysis. Proceedings of the 14th international conference on finance and banking. pp. 
161–169; 
- Chybalski, F. & Marcinkiewicz, E. (2014). How to measure and compare pension 
expenditures in cross-country analyses? Some methodological remarks. International 
Journal of Business and Management. Vol. 2. No 4. pp. 44-59; 
- Cipriani, G.P. (2013). Population aging and PAYG pensions in the OLG model. 
Journal of Population Economics. Vol.27. pp. 251-256; 
- Clements, B, Dybczak, K., Gaspar, V., Gupta, S., and Soto, M. (2015). The Fiscal 
Consequences of Shrinking Populations. IMF Staff Discussion Note; 
- Diamond, P. A. (1996). Proposals to Restructure Social Security. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. Vol. 10. No 3. pp. 67–88; 
- Domeij, D. & Flodén, M. (2006). Population aging and international capital 
flows. International Economic Review. Vol. 47. No 3. pp. 1013-1032; 
- Doménech, R. & de la Fuente, A. (2011). The Impact of Spanish Pension Reform 
on Expenditure: a Quick Estimate. Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series. No 542: 
- European Central Bank (2015). Public debt, population ageing and medium-
term growth. Occasional Paper Series. No 165; 
- European Commission (2012). The 2012 Ageing Report (Online). Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee
-2012-2_en.pdf (Accessed: 20/04/2016); 
- European Commission (2015). The 2015 Ageing Report (Online). Available from: 
http://europa.eu/epc/pdf/ageing_report_2015_en.pdf (Accessed: 20/04/2016); 




- European Commission (2016). EUROSTAT (Database). July 2016. Brussels: 
EUROSTAT. Available from: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (Accessed: 
23/07/2016); 
- European Parliament (2011). Pension Systems in the E.U. – Contingent Liabilities 
and Assets in the Public and Private Sector (Online). Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN 
(Accessed: 13/07/2016);  
- Feldstein, M. (1974), Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital 
Accumulation. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 82. No 5. pp. 905-926;  
- Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos (2015). PORDATA (Database). October 
2015. Lisbon: IGFSS/MSESS. Available from:  
http://www.pordata.pt/Tema/Portugal/Protec%C3%A7%C3%A3o+Social-10 (Accessed: 
15/03/2016); 
- Garcia, M. T. (2014). An Appraisal of Public Pension Reserve Funds Management 
- Evidence From Portugal. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 5. No 23. pp. 
333-341; 
- Garcia, M. T. & Lopes, E. G. (2009). The macroeconomic impact of reforming a 
PAYG system: The Portuguese Case. International Social Security Review. Vol. 62. No 1.  
pp. 1-23. 
- GEP/MSESS (2015). Avaliação Actuarial do Sistema Previdencial de Segurança 
Social (Online). Available from: 






- Grech, A. G. (2015). Convergence or divergence? How the financial crisis 
affected European pensioners. International Social Security Review. Vol. 68. No 2. pp. 
43-61; 
- Halmosi, P. (2014). Transformation of the Pension Systems in OECD Countries 
after the 2008 Crisis. Public Finance Quarterly. No 4. pp. 457-469;  
- Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização de Segurança Social - IGFCSS 
(2014). FEFSS – Relatório e Contas (Online). Available from: http://www.seg-
social.pt/documents/10152/13313718/Rel_Ativ_Contas_FEFSS_2014/901bffb7-018e-
4ea9-80c2-23ed6575a6e0 (Accessed: 22/04/2016); 
- Instituto Nacional de Estatística - INE (2014). Instituto de Informática 
(Database). September 2015. Lisbon. Available from: 
https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_bdc_tree&contexto=bd&selT
ab=tab2 (Accessed: 10/3/2016); 
- Ludwig, A., Schelkle, T. and Vogel, E. (2012). Demographic Change, Human 
Capital and Welfare. Review of Economic Dynamics. Vol. 15. pp. 94-107; 
- Martins, M. C. R. (2014). Determinants of Social Security Pensions Expenditure 
in Portugal; 
- Matsaganis, M. & Leventi, C. (2014). The distributional impact of austerity and 
the recession in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics. Vol. 19. No 3. pp. 
393-412; 




- Ministério das Finanças (2015). Portugal Stability Program (Online). Available 
from: 
http://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheActividadeParlame
ntar.aspx?BID=99969&ACT_TP=PEC (Accessed: 23/12/2015); 
- Moniz, M. B., Pinto, C. G. and Francisco, R. G. (2014). O Economista Insurgente: 
101 Perguntas Incómodas Sobre Portugal. 1st Ed. Lisbon: A Esfera dos Livros; 
- Natali, D. & Stamati, F. (2014). Reassessing South European pensions after the 
crisis: Evidence from two decades of reforms. South European Society and Politics. Vol. 
19. No 3. pp. 309-330; 
- OECD (2015). Pensions at a Glance 2015 (Online). Available from: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-at-a-
glance_19991363 (Accessed: 2/3/2016); 
-OECD (2016). OECD.stat (Database). September 2016. Paris: OECD. Available 
from: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS (Accessed: 12/09/2016); 
- Pedroso, P. (2014) Portugal and the global crisis: The impact of austerity on the 
economy, the social model and the performance of the State. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert 
Siftung. 
- Piketty, T. (2014). O Capital no séc. XXI. 1st Ed. LIsbon: Círculo de Leitores; 
- Ramaswamy, S. (2012). The Sustainability of Pension Schemes. Monetary and 
Economic Department. No 368;  
- Rodrigues, P. N. L. S. (2015) Does Social Security Reduce Private Saving? A Time-
Series Analysis to the Portuguese Case; 




- Rosa, M. J. V. (1996). Envelhecimento Demográfico: Proposta de Reflexão Sobre 
o Curso dos Factos. Análise Social. Vol. 31. pp. 1183-1198; 
- Santos, J., Pina, A., Braga, J. and St. Aubyn, M. (2010). Macroeconomia. 3rd Ed. 
Lisbon: Escolar Editora; 
- Segurança Social (2015). A Segurança Social – História (Online). Available from: 
http://www.seg-social.pt/historia (Accessed: 5/6/2016); 
- Van den Noord, P. & Herd, R. (1993). Pension Liabilities in the Seven Major 
Economies. OECD Economics Department – Working Papers. No 142; 
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Introductory Econometrics, A Modern Approach, 4th  
Ed.  Boston: South-Western; 
- World Bank (2006). Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems- 





Council of Ministers Resolution no. 110/2005, D. R. I Série. 124 (2005-06-30) 
4054-4056; 
Decree (Portaria) no. 514/90, D. R. I Série. 154 (1990-07-06) 2846-2847; 
Decree-Law no. 140-D/86, D. R. I Série. 134 (1986-06-14) 1406; 
Decree-Law no. 259/89, D. R. I Série. 186 (1989-08-14) 3277-3279; 
Decree.Law no. 329/93, D. R. I Série. I-A (1993-09-25) 5378-5391; 
Decree-Law no. 187/2007, D. R. I Série. 90 (2007-05-10) 3100-3116; 




Decree-Law no. 167-E/2013, D. R. I Série. 253 (2013-12-31) 364-369; 
Law no. 28/84, D. R. I Série. 188 (1984-08-14) 2501-2510; 
Law no. 17/2000, D. R. I Série. 182 (2000-08-08) 3813-3825; 
Law no. 32/2002, D. R. I Série. 294 (2002-12-20) 7954-7968; 
Law no. 4/2007, D. R. I Série. 11 (2007-01-16) 345-356; 





























Source: PORDATA (2015). Values in Percentage. 
 
FIGURE 5 – PENSION SPENDING BY GENERAL SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ON ELDERLY, 




Source: PORDATA (2015), OECD.stat (2016) and own calculations. Values in Percentage 
(pensions_to_gdp) and Ratio (APL). 
 
FIGURE 6 – PENSION SPENDING BY GENERAL SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ON 
ELDERLY, DISABILITY AND SURVIVAL SUPPORT AS A SHARE OF GDP AND APPARENT 



































Source: PORDATA (2015). Values in Percentage (pensions_to_gdp) and Individuals (un15_64). 
 
FIGURE 7 – PENSION SPENDING BY GENERAL SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ON 
ELDERLY, DISABILITY AND SURVIVAL SUPPORT AS A SHARE OF GDP AND UNEMPLOYED 
PERSONS AGED BETWEEN 15 AND 64 YEARS OLD (1975-2014) 
 
TABLE VII – VAR LAG ORDER SELECTION CRITERIA PROCEDURE 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 














Endogenous variables: PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD 
Exogenous variables: C REV1974 R1984 R1993 R2002 R2007
Sample: 1975 2014
Included observations: 36
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  73.71374 NA  7.52e-07 -2.761875 -1.706195 -2.393414
1  223.7269  216.6857  4.61e-10 -10.20705  -8.447584* -9.592949
2  251.7059   34.19661*   2.65e-10* -10.87255 -8.409300  -10.01281*
3  269.2584  17.55245  3.03e-10  -10.95880* -7.791761 -9.853418
4  284.9447  12.20047  4.62e-10 -10.94137 -7.070548 -9.590351
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion





Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE IX – JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST WITHOUT DUMMY VARIABLES 
Sample: 1975 2014
Included observations: 37
Series: PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD 
Lags interval: 1 to 2
 Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 0 1 1 1 1
Max-Eig 0 1 1 1 1
 *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)
 Information Criteria by Rank and Model
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Rank or No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No. of CEs No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0  192.5650  192.5650  195.6342  195.6342  199.7912
1  199.4257  208.0199  210.6990  212.6689  216.0536
2  204.8373  214.6224  217.2509  223.7600  226.8486
3  207.8471  218.6760  220.1204  228.7651  229.9657
4  210.2947  221.3637  221.3637  231.0177  231.0177
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -8.679192 -8.679192 -8.628876 -8.628876 -8.637363
1 -8.617606 -9.028103 -9.010758 -9.063185 -9.083981
2 -8.477689 -8.898507 -8.932482 -9.176216  -9.235057*
3 -8.207949 -8.631136 -8.655158 -8.960277 -8.971121
4 -7.907822 -8.289927 -8.289927 -8.595552 -8.595552
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -7.285965* -7.285965* -7.061496 -7.061496 -6.895830
1 -6.876073 -7.243032 -7.095072 -7.103961 -6.994141
2 -6.387850 -6.721591 -6.668490 -6.825147 -6.796911
3 -5.769803 -6.062375 -6.042859 -6.217363 -6.184668
4 -5.121369 -5.329322 -5.329322 -5.460793 -5.460793





Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE X – JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST WITH DUMMY VARIABLES 
Sample (adjusted): 1978 2014
Included observations: 37 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Quadratic deterministic trend
Series: PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace 0.05
Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.584823  62.45298  55.24578  0.0102
At most 1  0.442063  29.92813  35.01090  0.1580
At most 2  0.155065  8.338298  18.39771  0.6481
At most 3  0.055277  2.103951  3.841466  0.1469
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen 0.05
Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.584823  32.52485  30.81507  0.0306
At most 1  0.442063  21.58983  24.25202  0.1082
At most 2  0.155065  6.234347  17.14769  0.7936
At most 3  0.055277  2.103951  3.841466  0.1469
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD
 6.459502 -8.528931 -11.74891  1.431758
 1.636999 -6.766814 -37.79332 -1.097487
 6.475763 -3.688677 -25.99676 -0.853253
-1.854818  3.512219  20.29810 -2.584471
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha): 
D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP) -0.049258  0.008812 -0.016745 -0.027399
D(LUN15_64)  0.049632  0.030766 -0.012136 -0.015591
D(LAPL) -0.007377  0.006679  0.000878  0.001188
D(OAD) -0.029153  0.014410  0.032894 -0.001872
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood  216.0536
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD
 1.000000 -1.320370 -1.818858  0.221652
 (0.16300)  (0.93573)  (0.08153)














Source: Eviews 9 Output 
TABLE XI – VECM MODEL 
Sample (adjusted): 1978 2014
Included observations: 37 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Quadratic deterministic trend
Series: PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD 
Exogenous series: REV1974 R1984 R1993 R2002 R2007 
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized No. Of CE(s) Trace 0.05
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.739543  84.74033  55.24578  0.0000
At most 1  0.465835  34.96358  35.01090  0.0506
At most 2  0.248994  11.76271  18.39771  0.3270
At most 3  0.031076  1.168073  3.841466  0.2798
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Max-Eigen 0.05
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.739543  49.77675  30.81507  0.0001
At most 1  0.465835  23.20086  24.25202  0.0684
At most 2  0.248994  10.59464  17.14769  0.3447
At most 3  0.031076  1.168073  3.841466  0.2798
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD
 12.69343 -11.85874 -43.80396 -1.447985
-1.652246 -4.792849  1.232785 -0.865513
 6.893543 -12.18419 -77.04275  3.624849
-2.640094  3.024320  51.60657  6.022865
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha): 
D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP) -0.064894  0.049043  0.017126  0.003598
D(LUN15_64)  0.027971  0.066820  0.009376  0.000114
D(LAPL) -0.006699 -0.000976 -0.001274 -0.001297
D(OAD) -0.018053 -0.022361  0.024004 -0.006894
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood  259.8113
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
PENSIONS_TO_GDP LUN15_64 LAPL OAD
 1.000000 -0.934243 -3.450917 -0.114074
 (0.08485)  (0.61569)  (0.07355)














Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1  Sample (adjusted): 1978 2014
PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-1)  1.000000  Included observations: 37 after adjustments
LUN15_64(-1) -0.934243  Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
 (0.08485)
[-11.0107]  Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 9.01E-11
LAPL(-1) -3.450917  Determinant resid covariance  9.35E-12
 (0.61569)  Log likelihood  259.8113
[-5.60500]  Akaike information criterion -10.36818





Error Correction: D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP)D(LUN15_64) D(LAPL) D(OAD)
CointEq1 -0.823727  0.355044 -0.085035 -0.229154
 (0.25145)  (0.27994)  (0.02454)  (0.19648)
[-3.27589] [ 1.26830] [-3.46495] [-1.16627]
D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-1))  0.048722 -0.134046  0.037997  0.216371
 (0.23937)  (0.26649)  (0.02336)  (0.18705)
[ 0.20354] [-0.50301] [ 1.62640] [ 1.15678]
D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-2)) -0.023504 -0.327028  0.023747  0.140985
 (0.19428)  (0.21629)  (0.01896)  (0.15181)
[-0.12098] [-1.51196] [ 1.25233] [ 0.92867]
D(LUN15_64(-1))  0.402031  0.652833 -0.002592  0.147807
 (0.24351)  (0.27110)  (0.02377)  (0.19028)
[ 1.65098] [ 2.40812] [-0.10904] [ 0.77679]
D(LUN15_64(-2)) -0.006098  0.136222 -0.054351 -0.148583
 (0.24210)  (0.26952)  (0.02363)  (0.18918)
[-0.02519] [ 0.50542] [-2.30024] [-0.78542]
D(LAPL(-1)) -0.221389  3.246082 -0.463845 -1.234411
 (2.35803)  (2.62517)  (0.23014)  (1.84257)
[-0.09389] [ 1.23652] [-2.01547] [-0.66994]
D(LAPL(-2))  0.580083  0.776474 -0.055980 -0.496768
 (1.60695)  (1.78900)  (0.15684)  (1.25567)
[ 0.36098] [ 0.43403] [-0.35693] [-0.39562]
D(OAD(-1))  0.170345 -0.345219  0.035069  0.468223
 (0.26139)  (0.29100)  (0.02551)  (0.20425)
[ 0.65169] [-1.18632] [ 1.37463] [ 2.29241]
D(OAD(-2))  0.371367 -0.035296  0.046423  0.150022
 (0.20938)  (0.23310)  (0.02044)  (0.16361)
[ 1.77363] [-0.15142] [ 2.27169] [ 0.91694]
C -0.066069 -0.010129  0.001324 -0.066055
 (0.13892)  (0.15466)  (0.01356)  (0.10855)
[-0.47559] [-0.06550] [ 0.09766] [-0.60851]
@TREND(75)  0.007064  0.012654 -0.001357  0.003988
 (0.01497)  (0.01667)  (0.00146)  (0.01170)
[ 0.47172] [ 0.75905] [-0.92828] [ 0.34082]
REV1974 -0.268243 -0.002228  0.053747  0.162941
 (0.13658)  (0.15206)  (0.01333)  (0.10673)
[-1.96393] [-0.01465] [ 4.03186] [ 1.52670]
R1984  0.077589 -0.199898  0.054140  0.244170
 (0.11939)  (0.13292)  (0.01165)  (0.09329)
[ 0.64988] [-1.50395] [ 4.64628] [ 2.61728]
R1993 -0.383299  0.032310 -0.040317 -0.117924
 (0.17433)  (0.19408)  (0.01701)  (0.13622)
[-2.19869] [ 0.16648] [-2.36955] [-0.86567]
R2002 -0.099864 -0.004149  0.002105 -0.144916
 (0.16839)  (0.18746)  (0.01643)  (0.13158)
[-0.59306] [-0.02213] [ 0.12808] [-1.10136]
R2007  0.169199 -0.040558  0.000708  0.179928
 (0.10280)  (0.11445)  (0.01003)  (0.08033)
[ 1.64589] [-0.35438] [ 0.07054] [ 2.23988]
 R-squared  0.685045  0.413290  0.802777  0.842369
 Adj. R-squared  0.460078 -0.005789  0.661903  0.729776
 Sum sq. resids  0.304910  0.377908  0.002904  0.186175
 S.E. equation  0.120497  0.134148  0.011760  0.094157
 F-statistic  3.045086  0.986188  5.698563  7.481515
 Log likelihood  36.27442  32.30368  122.3691  45.40105
 Akaike AIC -1.095914 -0.881280 -5.749681 -1.589246
 Schwarz SC -0.399301 -0.184667 -5.053068 -0.892633
 Mean dependent  0.124324  0.023130  0.020237  0.367568
 S.D. dependent  0.163987  0.133761  0.020226  0.181129




Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
FIGURE 8 – VECM STABILITY 
 
TABLE XII – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - RESIDUALS 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE XIII – WHITE HETEROSKEDASTICITY TEST (NO CROSS TERMS) 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE XIV – COVARIANCE BETWEEN VARIABLES AND RESIDUALS 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
RESID01 RESID02 RESID03 RESID04
 Mean  2.25E-17 -3.00E-18  5.06E-18  7.50E-18
 Median -0.006967  0.014785 -0.001034  0.007436
 Maximum  0.235601  0.245342  0.017635  0.131231
 Minimum -0.190502 -0.219649 -0.020875 -0.168580
 Std. Dev.  0.092031  0.102457  0.008982  0.071913
 Skewness  0.399830  0.198200 -0.065383 -0.106813
 Kurtosis  3.113281  2.896632  2.899390  2.324144
 Jarque-Bera  1.005611  0.258718  0.041967  0.774560
 Probability  0.604831  0.878658  0.979235  0.678901
 Sum  9.30E-16 -5.55E-17  1.89E-16  3.05E-16
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.304910  0.377908  0.002904  0.186175
 Observations 37 37 37 37
Sample: 1975 2014
Included observations: 37
   Joint test:
Chi-sq df Prob.
 257.1420 250  0.3646
RESID01 RESID02 RESID03 RESID04
LAPL 0.000203 0.000378 6.809052e-05 -0.000336
LUN15_64 -0.00071 -0.000166 -6.941109e-05 0.000966
OAD -0.002602 -0.006206 8.657489e-05 0.007871
PENSIONS_TO_GDP 0.002162 -0.000867 -6.561464e-05 0.000443




TABLE XV – RESIDUAL NORMALITY TEST 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE XVI – RESIDUAL SERIAL CORRELATION LM TEST 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
 
TABLE XVII – VECM MODEL WITH P-VALUES 
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal
Sample: 1975 2014
Included observations: 37
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1  0.399830  0.985828 1  0.3208
2 -0.039593  0.009667 1  0.9217
3  0.267474  0.441177 1  0.5066
4 -0.430280  1.141701 1  0.2853
Joint  2.578373 4  0.6307
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  3.113281  0.019784 1  0.8881
2  2.672602  0.165250 1  0.6844
3  2.471544  0.430535 1  0.5117
4  2.776496  0.077013 1  0.7814
Joint  0.692582 4  0.9522
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  1.005611 2  0.6048
2  0.174917 2  0.9163
3  0.871713 2  0.6467
4  1.218713 2  0.5437
Joint  3.270955 8  0.9162




1  26.53845  0.0469
2  23.67038  0.0970
3  14.33662  0.5737
4  12.13793  0.7344
5  17.84991  0.3328
6  15.06970  0.5195
Probs from chi-square with 16 df.





Source: Eviews 9 Output 
TABLE XVIII – WALD TEST FOR THE VECM SHORT-RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
Source: Eviews 9 Output 
Dependent Variable: D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP)
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps)
Sample (adjusted): 1978 2014
Included observations: 37 after adjustments
D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP) = C(1)*( PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-1) -
        0.934243024013*LUN15_64(-1) - 3.45091727663*LAPL(-1) -
        0.114073635473*OAD(-1) + 0.02475749296*@TREND(75) +
        18.1948315066 ) + C(2)*D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-1)) + C(3)
        *D(PENSIONS_TO_GDP(-2)) + C(4)*D(LUN15_64(-1)) + C(5)
        *D(LUN15_64(-2)) + C(6)*D(LAPL(-1)) + C(7)*D(LAPL(-2)) + C(8)
        *D(OAD(-1)) + C(9)*D(OAD(-2)) + C(10) + C(11)*@TREND(75) + C(12)
        *REV1974 + C(13)*R1984 + C(14)*R1993 + C(15)*R2002 + C(16)
        *R2007
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) -0.823727 0.251451 -3.275886 0.0036
C(2) 0.048722 0.239372 0.203541 0.8407
C(3) -0.023504 0.194285 -0.120977 0.9049
C(4) 0.402031 0.243510 1.650984 0.1136
C(5) -0.006098 0.242097 -0.025189 0.9801
C(6) -0.221389 2.358032 -0.093887 0.9261
C(7) 0.580083 1.606951 0.360983 0.7217
C(8) 0.170345 0.261388 0.651695 0.5217
C(9) 0.371367 0.209383 1.773629 0.0906
C(10) -0.066069 0.138920 -0.475587 0.6393
C(11) 0.007064 0.014974 0.471721 0.6420
C(12) -0.268243 0.136585 -1.963930 0.0629
C(13) 0.077589 0.119390 0.649881 0.5228
C(14) -0.383299 0.174330 -2.198694 0.0392
C(15) -0.099864 0.168388 -0.593060 0.5595
C(16) 0.169199 0.102801 1.645886 0.1147
R-squared 0.685045     Mean dependent var 0.124324
Adjusted R-squared 0.460078     S.D. dependent var 0.163987
S.E. of regression 0.120497     Akaike info criterion -1.095914
Sum squared resid 0.304910     Schwarz criterion -0.399301
Log likelihood 36.27442     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.850326
F-statistic 3.045086     Durbin-Watson stat 2.327696
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009733
Test Statistic Value df Probability
F-statistic  1.364688 (2, 21)  0.2772
Chi-square  2.729377 2  0.2555
Null Hypothesis: C(4)=C(5)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(4)  0.402031  0.243510
C(5) -0.006098  0.242097
All restrictions are linear in coefficients.
Test Statistic Value df Probability
F-statistic  0.066009 (2, 21)  0.9363
Chi-square  0.132018 2  0.9361
Null Hypothesis: C(6)=C(7)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(6) -0.221389  2.358032
C(7)  0.580083  1.606951
Test Statistic Value df Probability
F-statistic  1.851988 (2, 21)  0.1817
Chi-square  3.703976 2  0.1569
Null Hypothesis: C(8)=C(9)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(8)  0.170345  0.261388
C(9)  0.371367  0.209383
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